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McCarthy: Davey Jones’s Lockup

COMMENT
DAVEY JONES’S LOCKUP: CHANGING
THE U.S. APPROACH TO PROSECUTION
AND PUNISHMENT OF MARITIME
PIRACY IN UNIVERSALJURISDICTION CASES
COLLIN MCCARTHY *
I.

INTRODUCTION

To the average American, the word “pirate” likely evokes images of
Johnny Depp, Captain Hook, or other peg-legged scallywags plundering
treasure-laden ships off the Spanish Main hundreds of years ago. For
others, however, including thousands of mariners, their families, employers, national governments, and those relying on the timely delivery of
precious food and supplies, the threat of pirates at sea is not merely a
thing of the past.1 Although attacks once again appear to be on the decline after reaching a staggering 445 reported incidents in 2010, the latest
International Maritime Bureau (IMB) figures show pirates attacked 245
vessels in 2014, with more than 440 mariners taken hostage.2 When coupled with the fact that over ninety percent of the world’s trade is con* J.D. Candidate, Golden Gate University School of Law, 2015. I would like to thank Laura
Patty for her advice and encouragement. I would also like to thank the members of the Golden Gate
University Law Review Board and Professor Ed Baskauskas for their feedback and assistance
preparing this Comment for publication.
1
See generally ICC INT’L MAR. BUREAU, PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS:
REPORT FOR THE PERIOD 1 JANUARY–31 DECEMBER 2014 (2015), available at http://www.hellenic
shippingnews.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/2014-Annual-IMB-Piracy-Report-ABRIDGED.pdf.
2
Id. at 5, 11. Although the number of reported incidents of piracy appears to be on the
decline, there is a general consensus among those in the maritime community that a significant
percentage of pirate attacks go unreported due to fears of lengthy investigations, costly delays, and
increased insurance premiums. See DAVID F. MARLEY, Modern Piracy: A Reference Handbook,
66–67 (2010).
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ducted by ship,3 it is no wonder this threat to human safety and the free
flow of maritime commerce has emerged as a grave concern for governments and industry around the globe in recent years.4
The latest upsurge in incidents occurring in West Africa’s Gulf of
Guinea and the waters of Southeast Asia demonstrates that maritime
piracy is not limited to any one region, but rather has reemerged as a
viable criminal enterprise for coastal crime syndicates around the globe.5
Unfortunately, as the pirates of today often hail from some of the most
lawless and under-resourced nations in the world, combating maritime
piracy in the modern era has proved to be an exceedingly difficult task.6
In Somalia, for example, extensive corruption, widespread poverty, and
the absence of a stable central government created an environment in
which pirate gangs could carry out their operations largely unfettered,
wreaking havoc on one of the world’s most vital shipping routes.7 Similarly, increased conflict and “continued fragility in many West African
governments [have] provided space for pirate groups to operate,” threatening one of the largest oil-producing regions in the world.8 With such
regions ill-equipped to combat the threat of piracy on their own, responsibility for addressing the problem has fallen largely on the international
community, including national governments, international organizations,
and members of the shipping industry.9
While the international response to piracy thus far, including the deployment of multinational naval task forces, increased vessel security
measures, and various regional counter-piracy agreements has proved
successful in reducing the threat in recent years,10 the importance of a
comprehensive and consistent legal response to the piracy problem cannot be overlooked. According to a recent UN Secretary General report,
3
Introduction to IMO, INT’L MAR. ORG., http://www.imo.org/About/Pages/Default.aspx (last
visited Feb. 18, 2015).
4
See generally Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, INT’L MAR. ORG., http://www.imo.
org/OurWork/Security/PiracyArmedRobbery/Pages/Default.aspx (last visited Feb. 18, 2015).
5
See generally ICC INT’L MAR. BUREAU, supra note 1; Bryan Abell, Return to Chaos: The
2013 Resurgence of Nigerian Piracy and 2014 Forecast, GCAPTAIN.COM (Jan. 14, 2014), http://
gcaptain.com/nigerian-piracy-resurgence-bryan-abell/.
6
See Eugene Kontorovich, “A Guantánamo on the Sea”: The Difficulty of Prosecuting Pirates and Terrorists, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 243, 244–46 (2010).
7
See Christopher Alessi & Stephanie Hanson, Combating Maritime Piracy, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS, http://www.cfr.org/piracy/combating-maritime-piracy/p18376 (last updated
Mar. 23, 2012).
8
Brandon Prins, What Drives Maritime Piracy in Sub-Saharan Africa?, PIRACY-STUDIES.ORG
(Nov. 11, 2014), http://piracy-studies.org/2014/what-drives-maritime-piracy-in-sub-saharan-africa/.
9
See Alessi & Hanson, supra note 7.
10
See Statement of Rear Adm. Joseph W. Kuzmick, U.S. Navy, Before the Subcommittee on
Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, U.S.
House of Representatives, 3 (Apr. 10, 2013), available at http://www.navy.mil/ah_online/antipiracy/
images/gallery/testimony.pdf.
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nearly nine out of ten pirates captured by naval forces are released without facing prosecution, significantly undermining any deterrent effect
such forces may have.11 This is in part because, despite international law
providing a “uniquely favorable framework for its suppression” by way
of the universal-jurisdiction doctrine,12 prosecution of pirates remains an
expensive and often complicated task.13 Evidentiary issues and deficient
domestic statutes are some of the most commonly cited obstacles to prosecution, but fears over lengthy incarcerations and potential asylum
claims have also left many countries reluctant to exercise jurisdiction
over suspected pirates to the full extent of the law.14
Recognizing the need for the United States government to take a leadership role in confronting and suppressing the resurging threat of maritime piracy, this Comment evaluates the current status of maritime piracy
laws in the United States. Moreover, as the use of legal mechanisms will
play a vital part in combating maritime piracy, this Comment seeks to
demonstrate that the statutory system as it stands is both outdated and illsuited for addressing the complexities of piracy in the modern era, and
will only impede the achievement of current strategic objectives. More
specifically, as the crime of piracy is no longer committed by just one
rogue ship and its crew, this Comment highlights the need for a system
that takes into account the evolution of piracy to include multiple actors
both at sea and on shore, addressing varying degrees of culpability and
imposing sentences fit for the crime. As evidenced by the recent decision striking down the sole U.S. universal jurisdiction piracy15 statute as
unconstitutional as applied,16 the system as it stands is inconsistent with
both U.S. and international standards, and limits use of the judicial system as a means to suppress the crime.
11
U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Legal
Issues Related to Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, 2–3, UN DOC. S/2011/30 (Jan. 25, 2011), available at http://www.un.org/depts/los/piracy/piracy_documents.htm (follow “S/2011/30” hyperlink;
then follow “English” hyperlink).
12
Kontorovich, supra note 6, at 244.
13
See JONATHAN BELLISH, ONE EARTH FOUND., THE ECONOMIC COST OF SOMALI PIRACY
2012, at 27–30 (2013), available at http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/attachments/
View%20Full%20Report_1.pdf.
14
See Yvonne M. Dutton, Pirates and Impunity: Is the Threat of Asylum Claims a Reason To
Allow Pirates To Escape Justice?, 34 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 236, 239–41 (2011).
15
The term “general piracy” refers to the crime of piracy as defined by international law and
subject to universal jurisdiction, or subject to prosecution by any nation. In contrast, “municipal
piracy” may include any act deemed as piracy by the enacting government, but it requires a jurisdictional nexus before that nation may prosecute. For example, in the United States, 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 1651 (Westlaw 2015) serves as the sole general piracy statute, incorporating by reference the
international definition of piracy. Other statutes, including 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1652 and 1655 (Westlaw
2015), enumerate certain acts amounting to municipal piracy. See United States v. Hasan, 747 F.
Supp. 2d 599, 605 (E.D. Va. 2010).
16
United States v. Said (Said II), 3 F. Supp. 3d 515 (E.D. Va. 2014).
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Part II of this Comment provides an overview of the size and scope
of the world’s piracy problem in 2015, as well as a brief discussion of the
responses taken by the international community to date. Part III discusses the current system of piracy laws in the United States, explained
in light of what was learned from the first universal jurisdiction piracy
cases to be tried in nearly 200 years. Part IV discusses the consequences
of these most recent decisions, arguing that the current one-statute-fits-all
approach is improper for addressing piracy in the twenty-first century, as
it is over-inclusive and unreasonably exposes certain individuals to punishments unfitting for their crimes. Finally, Part V presents simple recommendations for updating the U.S. piracy statutory scheme, in
accordance with the principles of universal jurisdiction, international
law, and evolving standards of criminal punishment.
II.

A BRIEF OVERVIEW: MARITIME PIRACY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY

Although the crime of piracy has existed nearly as long as man has
sailed the seas, pirates have reemerged in recent decades to once again
pose a serious threat to mariners and marine transportation around the
globe.17 As noted above, despite international efforts leading to a steady
downturn since attacks reached a peak in 2010, the latest IMB reports
show the threat remains far from eradicated. IMB figures place the total
number of reported attacks at roughly 1700 since 2010,18 though some
estimate the actual number of attacks to be closer to twice that amount,
as incidents frequently go unreported.19 Moreover, it is not only the
number of attacks that is alarming, but also the increasing success rate
and level of violence against crews.20 As piracy is no longer a new phenomenon in many parts of the world, pirate gangs have grown increasingly sophisticated and highly skilled in their operations, as well as more
heavily armed and dangerous.21 In sum, although it is encouraging that
17

See generally ICC INT’L MAR. BUREAU, supra note 1; THE WHITE HOUSE, UNITED STATES
COUNTER PIRACY AND MARITIME SECURITY ACTION PLAN 2 (June 20, 2014), available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/united_states_counter_piracy_and_maritime_security
_action_plan_2014.pdf (“Piracy and related maritime crime continue to plague mariners throughout
the world and will continue to pose obstacles to the lawful use of the maritime domain.”).
18
ICC INT’L MAR. BUREAU, supra note 1, at 5.
19
See MARLEY, supra note 2, at 66–67.
20
See Alan Cowell, West African Piracy Exceeds Somali Attacks, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES,
June 18, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/19/world/africa/west-african-piracy-exceeds-so
mali-attacks-report-says.html?_r=0 (discussing the higher success rates of remaining Somali pirates
as well as the greater level of violence experienced in the latest West African attacks).
21
See id.
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the overall number of attacks appears to be on the decline, this decrease
in volume can be misleading.
A.

THE MODERN PIRATE

Comparing the two side by side, the pirates of today and those of
centuries past share a number of similarities. Modern pirates still attack,
loot, and hijack ships for ransom, and they still thrive in regions characterized by political instability, ineffective law enforcement, and advantageous geography.22 Many modern pirates are also the same kind of
ruthless individuals, known for spending their loot on “bling” and bad
habits rather than a new law-abiding lifestyle.23 Instead, the major difference in piracy today is not who is carrying out the attack, but rather
how they are doing it.
The first and perhaps most obvious difference in piracy operations
today stems from the dramatic advancements in weaponry and technology, as well as the widespread availability of such equipment.24 Most
significantly, heavy machine guns, high-powered outboard engines, satellite phones, and GPS devices have all become commonplace in the
modern pirate’s outfit, giving them a significant advantage over their
early counterparts, as well as their intended targets.25 In a typical attack,
pirates locate their target, set out from a “mother ship” in speedy skiffs
armed with AK-47s, rocket-propelled grenades, grappling hooks, and
ladders, board the ship and seize the crew.26 Once on board, the pirates
will either rob the ship and its crew of any cash, electronics, or other
valuables, or in some instances, redirect the ship to a safe holding point
to unload cargo or contact the vessel owner.27 In cases of the latter, the
pirates can then use the ship, its crew, or its cargo as leverage in ransom
negotiations, or they can sell the ship’s cargo on the black market.28
A second major difference in maritime piracy today is the level of
sophistication in piracy operations, or more specifically, the number of
actors involved in the preparation and execution of any given attack, both
22
See Daniel Pines, Maritime Piracy: Changes in U.S. Law Needed To Combat This Critical
National Security Concern, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 69, 75–78 (2012).
23
Faith Karimi, African Pirates Use Millions of Dollars in Ransom on Drugs, Real Estate,
Prostitutes, CNN (Nov. 2, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/11/02/world/africa/horn-of-africapiracy-loot/.
24
Neal Ungerleider, Somali Pirates Go High Tech, FAST COMPANY (June 22, 2011), http://
www.fastcompany.com/1762331/somali-pirates-go-high-tech.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
See THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 17, annexes A, B.
28
Id.
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at sea and on shore.29 For example, in the case of Somali pirates, whose
activities may entail weeks or even months at sea, significant capital is
needed to fund piracy operations, often requiring as many as three to five
financial backers.30 Following a successful attack, additional players receiving a cut of the ransom include kingpins, negotiators, lawyers, and
bankers, as well as local militias in control of the region’s ports.31 According to some estimates, the pirates carrying out an attack receive as
little as one tenth of a percent of the total ransom payment, with financiers and militias receiving the bulk of the payout.32 This multifarious
system has made both capture and prosecution increasingly difficult, as
the pirates at sea make up just one small part of the larger groups responsible for their attacks.33
B.

PIRACY HOTSPOTS

1.

Somalia and the Gulf of Aden

Piracy in the Gulf of Aden first began in the early 1990’s in response
to the collapse of the Somali government and economy, as well as frequent toxic dumping and unauthorized fishing by foreign vessels.34
However, as former fishermen soon discovered vessel owners’ willingness to pay out large sums for the safe return of their crews and cargo,
piracy in the region quickly evolved from “a fairly ad hoc, disorganized
effort to a highly developed criminal enterprise.”35 As Somalia-based
pirates grew increasingly experienced, incidents of piracy in the region
grew to as many as 236 in 2011, accounting for more than half of all
reported incidents worldwide that year.36
Equipped with heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades,
Somali pirates set out in small outboard powered skiffs, tracking down
slow-moving commercial vessels transiting the region.37 Once aboard,
29
See Christopher Harress, Secret Flow of Somali Piracy Ransoms: 179 Hijacked Ships Generated Some $400M in Payments Since 2005. So Where Has It All Gone?, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Nov. 4,
2013, 3:58 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/secret-flow-somali-piracy-ransoms-179-hijacked-shipsgenerated-some-400m-payments-2005-so-where-has.
30
See Somali Piracy: More Sophisticated Than You Thought, ECONOMIST, Nov. 2, 2013,
available at http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21588942-new-study-revealshow-somali-piracy-financed-more-sophisticated-you.
31
See id.; Harress, supra note 29.
32
Harress, supra note 29.
33
Somali Piracy: More Sophisticated Than You Thought, supra note 30.
34
See Michael Gagain, Neglected Waters: Territorial Maritime Piracy and Developing
States: Somalia, Nigeria, and Indonesia, 16 NEW ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 169, 186–88 (2010).
35
Statement of Rear Adm. Joseph W. Kuzmick, supra note 10, at 2.
36
ICC INT’L MAR. BUREAU, supra note 1, at 5.
37
THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 17, annex A, at 2.
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pirates capture the crew and hijack the vessel, which are then used as
leverage in ransom negotiations, often yielding multi-million-dollar
payouts.38 It is estimated Somali pirates have received hundreds of millions of dollars in ransom payments over the course of the past decade,
which they used to fund further piracy operations and expand their criminal enterprises to include other illicit activities.39 Factoring in additional
on-board security, vessel rerouting, increased insurance rates, and other
protective measures, piracy and related maritime crime in the region
“cost[ ] the international community billions of dollars annually.”40
Although incidents of piracy in the Gulf of Aden are now at their
lowest levels since 2006, ships still do not transit the region peacefully,
and “the conditions that allowed piracy to flourish still exist in Somalia
today.”41 Moreover, as Somalia sits along one of the world’s most vital
shipping corridors, the Gulf of Aden, piracy in the region has the ability
to undermine confidence in global sea lanes of communication, threaten
revenue and resources, increase maritime insurance rates and cargo costs,
and endanger the lives of seafarers.42 It is for these reasons that antipiracy efforts in the Horn of Africa have become a focal point of U.S.
national security strategy in the region.43
2.

Southeast Asia

Southeast Asia was the most pirate-infested region in the world between 1992 and 2006, with more than 450 attacks occurring in the year
2000 alone.44 This high incidence of piracy is partly attributable to the
region’s pirate-friendly geography, as it is home to more than 20,000
islands and countless waterways, as well as some of the world’s busiest
seaports and shipping lanes.45 The Strait of Malacca, for example, is
transited by nearly 25,000 containerships annually, linking the markets
of Asia and Europe.46 Such high-volume shipping provides pirates ample
targets to carry out their attacks.
38

Id.
Id. (citing BELLISH, supra note 13).
40
Id. annex A, at 1–2.
41
Id. annex A, at 1.
42
Id.
43
See generally id. annex A.
44
Carolin Liss, The Roots of Piracy in Southeast Asia, APSNET POLICY FORUM 1 (Oct. 22,
2007), http://nautilus.org/apsnet/the-roots-of-piracy-in-southeast-asia/#axzz2wdyez05O.
45
Id.
46
Marcus Hand, Malacca Straits Transits Hit All Time High in 2013, Pass 2008 Peak, SEATRADE GLOBAL (Feb. 10, 2014), http://www.seatrade-global.com/news/asia/malacca-straits-transitshit-all-time-high-in-2013-pass-2008-peak.html.
39
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Until recently, incidents of piracy occurring in Southeast Asia have
been characterized as less organized and more opportunistic.47 Attacks in
the region are often carried out in a quick hit-and-run style, using small
arms while vessels are anchored close to shore or tied up in one of the
region’s many ports.48 More recently, however, the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre has noted an increase in hijackings of larger coastal tanker
ships transiting the region, indicating a possible shift in pirate tactics.49
According to IMB reports, at least six tankers were hijacked for their
cargoes of diesel or gas oil between April and July 2014, “sparking fears
of a new trend.”50
Irrespective of the tactics employed, it is evident that pirate activity
is once again on the rise in Southeast Asia as of early 2015.51 In 2013
more than 125 incidents of piracy were reported throughout region, 106
of which occurred in Indonesian waters.52 This trend continued through
2014, with 141 attacks taking place in the region as a whole, and 100 in
Indonesia alone.53 Events in Indonesia accounted for nearly half of all
vessels boarded by pirates in 2014, with pirates in the region experiencing some of the highest success rates in recent years.54 Although piracy
in Southeast Asia has been effectively managed by regional partnerships
in the past, the region’s high shipping traffic and critical shipping lanes
render the resurgence of piracy in the region both a U.S. and a global
concern.55
3.

Nigeria and the Gulf of Guinea

As of late, West Africa’s Gulf of Guinea has emerged as the latest
hotbed for incidents of maritime piracy.56 Although piracy in Nigeria
and surrounding nations is nothing new—piracy in the region has
“waxed and waned” since the 1990’s57—larger attacks, including morefrequent hijackings and kidnappings, “are of growing concern for both
mariners and the oil industry operating in the region.”58 IMB figures
47

Liss, supra note 44.
Id.
49
IMB Reports Worrying Trend of Small Tanker Hijacks in Southeast Asian Waters, ICC
(July 22, 2014), https://icc-ccs.org/news/947-imb-reports-worrying-trend-of-small-tanker-hijacks-insoutheast-asian-waters.
50
Id.
51
ICC INT’L MAR. BUREAU, supra note 1, at 5.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 8.
55
See The White House, supra note 17, annex B, at 1.
56
Id.
57
Id. annex B, at 2.
58
Id. annex B, at 1.
48
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show 51 reported incidents in 2013, accounting for roughly twenty percent of all attacks worldwide that year.59 However, as incidents in the
region often go unreported, members of the Nigerian Navy estimate actual numbers to be closer to 100 attacks annually, with some “ten to 15
attacks every month in recent years.”60
While historically acts of piracy in and around the Gulf of Guinea
typically took the form of low-level robberies carried out against vessels
operating close to shore, hijackings for cargo theft, particularly petroleum products, now constitute a majority of incidents in the region.61
Pirates in the region are often more violent than their east African counterparts,62 and significant numbers of kidnappings also occur.63 As outlined in the June 2014 U.S. Counter Piracy and Maritime Security Action
Plan, “[w]hen maritime criminals focus on the high value cargo aboard
oil tankers and general cargo vessels, with little regard for the operators,
it becomes much more dangerous for mariners.”64
Of particular concern in the Gulf of Guinea is the region’s vital role
in the global energy market.65 The region produces more than 3 million
barrels of oil each day, roughly one third of Africa’s total output.66 Nigeria is also one of the world’s top exporters of liquefied natural gas.67
The United States plays a large role in the West African oil and gas
industries, and some seventy U.S. registered offshore supply vessels currently service the region.68 In October 2013 Nigerian pirates attacked
one such American supply vessel and abducted the captain and chief engineer, leading to a three-week standoff concluded upon payment of an
undisclosed ransom by the shipping company.69 As further escalation of
pirate activity in West Africa will increasingly put U.S. citizens and interests at risk, suppressing piracy in the region has become a focal point
of U.S. strategy in the region.70
59

ICC INT’L MAR. BUREAU, supra note 1, at 5.
U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, MARITIME PIRACY IN THE GULF OF GUINEA, 51 (2012),
available at http://www.unodc.org/documents/toc/Reports/TOCTAWestAfrica/West_Africa_TOC_
PIRACY.pdf.
61
See THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 17, annex B, at 2.
62
U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, supra note 60, at 50.
63
See THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 17, annex B, at 1.
64
Id.
65
See id. annex B, at 2.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Id. annex B, at 2–3.
69
Barbara Starr & Catherine E. Shoichet, 2 Seized in Pirate Attack off Nigeria, U.S. Official
Says, CNN (Oct. 25, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/24/world/africa/nigeria-vessel-attack/
index.html.
70
See generally THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 17, annex B.
60
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THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO PIRACY

As piracy has reemerged to threaten mariners and the lawful use of
the maritime domain in recent years, resolving the issue has become a
matter of increasing importance to the United States and throughout the
international community.71 During this period a variety of antipiracy
tactics have been employed, including the adoption of numerous international agreements, the deployment of naval task forces, and increased onboard security measures, including the adoption of best management
practices.72 Additionally, prosecution efforts by a range of nations have
increased in recent years, with the threat of judicial sentencing providing
both a means of punishment as well as effective deterrence.73 Together
these measures have proved successful in reducing incidents of piracy in
many of the most dangerous regions of the world, and their continued
use will be critical to widespread eradication of the threat.74
First, the United Nations and other regional organizations have enabled multinational antipiracy efforts through the adoption of partnership
agreements and the creation of information-sharing centers.75 This approach began with the 2004 Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery (ReCAAP), entered into by twenty
Asian nations, which played a critical role in reducing incidents of piracy
in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.76 The agreement provided an
opportunity for regional nations to collaborate in their efforts to patrol
the waters of the region and established an information-sharing center to
better facilitate cooperation.77 This model was subsequently followed as
the threat of piracy increased dramatically in Somalia and the Gulf of
Aden, where the United Nations Security Council adopted several resolutions to enable similar coordination.78 The resolutions, implemented by
the so-called Djibouti Code, promote cooperation and information sharing amongst a range of participating nations, and authorize foreign ves71

See generally THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 17.
See THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 17, annexes A, B.
73
Eugene Kontorovich, The Penalties for Piracy: An Empirical Study of National Prosecution of International Crime 1–2 (Nw. Univ. Sch. of Law Scholarly Commons, Working Paper 211,
2012), available at http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1210
&context=facultyworkingpapers.
74
See THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 17, annex A, at 2–8.
75
See Djibouti Code of Conduct, INT’L MAR. ORG., http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Security/
PIU/Pages/DCoC.aspx (last visited Feb. 25, 2015); Regional Information Sharing Centres, INT’L
MAR. ORG. (Dec. 3, 2014), http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Security/WestAfrica/Pages/MTISC-Gulfof-Guinea.aspx.
76
About ReCAAP, RECAAP.ORG, http://www.recaap.org/AboutReCAAPISC.aspx (last visited Feb. 25, 2015).
77
Id.
78
Djibouti Code of Conduct, supra note 75.
72
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sels to enter Somali waters and use all means necessary to repress acts of
piracy in the region.79 Similar efforts are currently being implemented to
address the burgeoning piracy situation in West Africa.80
Second, several international naval fleets are dedicated to combating
piracy in the Gulf of Aden and surrounding Indian Ocean.81 Following
the adoption the Djibouti Code, the United States Navy established Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151) to conduct antipiracy missions off the
Somali coast.82 CTF-151 is a multinational force, with command rotated
between participating nations every four to six months.83 Additionally,
NATO has deployed fleets to the region as part of Operation Allied Protector, and the European Union established Operation ATALANTA to
fulfill the same role.84 Together, these forces, along with support vessels
contributed by other members of the international community, have engaged in a variety of distinct antipiracy missions, ranging from incident
response and disruption to the establishment of patrol areas and protected
transit corridors.85
Third, the adoption of increased on-board security measures by shippers has also led to a significant reduction in pirate attacks.86 For example, most have adopted the Maritime Safety Committee’s Best
Management Practice Guide (BMPs), which emphasizes the need for
merchant vessels to take every possible measure to protect themselves
from pirates.87 The BMPs outline a number of on-board safety practices
and precautions that have helped better identify high-risk areas and prevent attacks through communication with naval forces and defensive
measures.88 Additionally, the hiring of private armed security guards has
grown increasingly popular with shippers frequently transiting high-risk
areas.89 To date, not a single vessel with armed security guards has been
attacked; however, pirates have grown increasingly skilled at targeting
79

Id.
Regional Information Sharing Centres, supra note 75.
81
CTF-151: Counter-Piracy, COMBINEDMARITIMEFORCES.COM, http://combinedmaritime
forces.com/ctf-151-counter-piracy/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2015).
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id.; THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 17, annex B, at 2.
85
W. Michael Reisman & Bradley T. Tennis, Combating Piracy in East Africa, 35 YALE J.
INT’L L. ONLINE 14, 19 (2009).
86
See Statement of Rear Adm. Joseph W. Kuzmick, supra note 10, at 3.
87
See id.
88
See id. (“BMPs include the use of concertina, razor wire, and water hoses; transiting at
speeds above 16 knots; use of ship citadels; and avoiding high-risk areas.”).
89
See Repelling Pirate Attacks: The Measures To Protect a Ship, TELEGRAPH (Feb. 10,
2014), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sponsored/culture/captain-phillips-film/10367534/securityagainst-pirate-attacks.html.
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unprotected vessels, and many foreign states as well as some vessel types
forbid the use of firearms on board.90
Lastly, increased prosecution of pirates has become an integral part
of the international strategy to combat the threat.91 Several nations have
amped up prosecution efforts in recent years, with some 1400 pirates
now held in more than twenty nations around the world.92 Prosecution
provides an effective way to punish pirates for their actions, but it also
plays an important role in deterring pirates, as well as future pirates, from
pursuing the occupation.93 Still, as many as ninety percent of captured
pirates are released without facing prosecution, as evidentiary issues and
deficient domestic statutes make conviction a difficult task.94 As the
United States continues to take a leadership role in the fight against
piracy, insuring these obstacles do not impede prosecution as a means to
achieve the strategic objective is of vital importance moving forward.
III.

MARITIME PIRACY LAW IN THE UNITED STATES

A.

THE CRIME OF PIRACY AND THE UNIVERSAL-JURISDICTION
DOCTRINE

Throughout modern history, the term “piracy” has been used to describe two distinct offenses: (1) piracy as a violation of a nation’s domestic laws, known as “municipal piracy,” and (2) piracy as a violation of
customary international law, known as “general piracy.”95 At the domestic level, municipal piracy includes any act deemed as such by statute.96
Violators of municipal piracy statutes may be prosecuted so long as there
exists a jurisdictional nexus between the prosecuting nation and the
crimes, such as acts occurring within a nation’s territorial waters or carried out against a nationally registered vessel.97 For example, in the
United States, 18 U.S.C. § 1655 provides that on a vessel, “whoever . . .
lays violent hands upon his commander, to hinder and prevent his fighting in defense . . . is a pirate.” While violators of this statute may be
considered “pirates” in the eyes of the U.S. government, such conduct
may not necessarily satisfy the definition of piracy under customary in90
See Statement of Rear Adm. Joseph W. Kuzmick, supra note 10, at 4–5; see also THE
WHITE HOUSE, supra note 17, annex B, at 5.
91
Kontorovich, supra note 73, at 1.
92
THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 10, annex A, at 2.
93
Id. annex A, at 3, 6.
94
See Dutton, supra note 14, at 239–41.
95
United States v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 599, 605–06 (E.D. Va. 2010) (citing Edwin D.
Dickinson, Is the Crime of Piracy Obsolete?, 38 HARV. L. REV. 334, 335–36 (1925)).
96
Id. at 606.
97
Id.
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ternational law and would therefore require a jurisdictional nexus with
the United States in order to subject violators to prosecution under the
statute.
In contrast, general piracy, otherwise known as “piracy jure gentium,” or “the international crime of piracy,” refers to “those offenses
that the international community agrees constitute piracy,” commonly referred to as customary international law.98 Significantly, in a case of
general piracy, any nation may assert jurisdiction over foreign nationals
committing the crime, regardless of any jurisdictional connection.99 For
example, general piracy statutes may apply to incidents of piracy occurring in foreign countries in which no U.S. citizens or vessels were directly involved, as is often the case for incidents occurring off the coasts
of Africa. This authority stems from the international law doctrine of
universal jurisdiction.100 The universal-jurisdiction doctrine provides an
exception to the requirement of a jurisdictional nexus between a nation
and the extraterritorial activities of non-nationals, allowing any nation to
define and punish certain offenses recognized by the international community as a universal concern.101 General piracy is recognized as the first
universal-jurisdiction crime; the nations of the world have long considered pirates to be universal enemies of mankind, “[b]ecause [they] commit[ ] hostilities upon the subjects and property of any or all nations,
without any regard to right or duty, or any pretence of public authority.”102 Importantly, however, “it is only when a state proscribes piracy
in a manner that mirrors the international consensus definition . . . that
the state can assert the universal jurisdiction doctrine.”103
B.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF MARITIME PIRACY LAW IN THE UNITED
STATES

Article I, Section 8, of the U.S. Constitution grants Congress the
authority to “define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the
High Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations.”104 As expressed
by the language “piracies” and “offenses against the law of nations,” the
so-called “Define and Punish Clause” grants Congress the power to
98

Id.
Id.
100
Id. at 606–07.
101
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 404 (1987).
102
United States v. Ali, 718 F.3d 929, 934 (D.C. Cir. June 11, 2013) (quoting United States v.
Brig Malek Adhel, 42 U.S. 210, 232 (1844)).
103
Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 609 (citing United States v. Shi, 525 F.3d 709, 722–24 (9th Cir.
2008)).
104
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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adopt both municipal and general piracy statutes.105 Congress has enacted legislation pursuant to this authority on several occasions throughout history; however, “initial attempts by Congress to criminalize the
international crime of piracy proved difficult” because of the need for
statutory language that mirrored the customary international-law definition, which was susceptible to change over time.106
Congress first attempted to proscribe acts of piracy in accordance
with international law in section 8 of the Act of 1790.107 The Act defined
piracy as robbery, murder, or any other offense punishable by death,
committed by any person or persons on the high seas.108 This statute was
first put to the test in the Supreme Court in United States v. Palmer, in
which a group of suspected pirates was accused of attacking and capturing a Spanish vessel on the high seas.109 The Court rejected the government’s position that Congress intended the Act of 1790 to apply to
offenses committed by foreign nationals against foreign vessels and concluded the statute was insufficient for the United States to invoke universal jurisdiction over the suspected pirates.110 The following year, in
response to the decision in Palmer, Congress passed the Act of 1819, this
time clearly expressing its intent to proscribe acts of piracy as an international offense subject to universal jurisdiction.111 Section 5 of the 1819
Act provided in part, “[I]f any person or persons whatsoever, shall, on
the high seas, commit the crime of piracy, as defined by the law of nations, and such offender or offenders, shall afterwards be brought into or
found in the United States, every such offender or offenders shall, upon
conviction thereof, . . . be punished with death.”112 Rather than attempting to specifically enumerate the types of piratical conduct forbidden by
international law, Congress opted to reference the international definition
so as to ensure the statute would proscribe exactly what is required to
invoke universal jurisdiction. Just a year after the enactment of the Act of
1819, the Supreme Court in United States v. Smith upheld the statute as
an acceptable exercise of authority by Congress and sufficient for purposes of invoking universal jurisdiction over captured pirates.113 Although section 5 of the 1819 Act was subsequently amended and
105

See Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 603–06.
Id. at 609.
107
See id. at 612.
108
Act of Apr. 30, 1790, § 8, 1 Stat. 112, 113–14.
109
See United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. 610 (1818).
110
Palmer, 16 U.S. at 633–34.
111
Id.
112
Act of Mar. 3, 1819, § 5, 3 Stat. 510, 513–14 (emphasis added).
113
United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153 (1820); see Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 616.
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renewed by Congress in the Act of 1820, the language regarding acts of
general piracy remained unchanged.114
Today, 18 U.S.C. § 1651 serves as the United States’ sole general
piracy statute authorizing the exercise of universal jurisdiction.115 Section 1651 provides, “Whoever, on the high seas, commits the crime of
piracy as defined by the law of nations, and is afterwards brought into or
found in the United States, shall be imprisoned for life.”116 The statute,
which can be traced back to section 5 of the 1819 Act of Congress, has
retained the incorporation of the international definition by reference,
with the only significant change being a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment as opposed to death.117 Although the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia recently held that § 1651’s mandatory
sentence of life imprisonment as applied violated the Eighth Amendment,118 it remains the sole statute arguably capable of reaching acts of
piracy lacking a jurisdictional connection to the United States.
C.

“PIRACY AS DEFINED BY THE LAW OF NATIONS”

Because of § 1651’s reference to “piracy as defined by the law of
nations,” discerning the precise definition of piracy according to international law is critical for the application of the statute. Fortunately, as the
judges deciding the most recent batch of piracy cases have now discussed this issue at length, it is now established that Article 101 of the
United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) articulates
the current definition of piracy for purposes of the statute.119 As set forth
in UNCLOS Article 101, the following acts are prohibited by § 1651:
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation,
committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private
ship or a private aircraft, and directed:
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft;
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the
jurisdiction of any State;
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of
an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
114

See Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 612.
See id. at 623–30.
116
18 U.S.C.A. § 1651 (Westlaw 2015) (emphasis added).
117
Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 617.
118
Said II, 3 F. Supp. 3d 515, 519–26 (E.D. Va. 2014).
119
Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 599; see United States v. Ali, 718 F.3d 929, 936–37 (D.C. Cir.
2013); United States v. Dire, 680 F.3d 446, 469 (4th Cir. 2012).
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(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described
in subparagraph (a) or (b). 120

U.S. courts first began applying the definition of piracy articulated in
UNCLOS Article 101 in a recent series of cases resulting from two Somali pirate attacks carried out against U.S. Navy frigates, the USS
Nicholas and USS Ashland, in 2010.121 Faced with discerning the definition of piracy for the sake of § 1651 for the first time in nearly 200 years,
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia ultimately concluded that the number of parties to UNCLOS and widespread implementation of the agreement’s provisions indicated sufficient international
consensus.122 Although the United States has not yet signed or ratified
UNCLOS because of disagreements over certain elements of the treaty,
the United States has nonetheless accepted most elements of UNCLOS
as reflective of customary international law, or “the law of nations.”123
IV.

MODERNIZING THE U.S. APPROACH TO MARITIME PIRACY

As set forth in the recent United States Counter Piracy and Maritime
Security Action Plan, increased prosecution of pirates is a critical component of the national strategy for combating maritime piracy, protecting
U.S citizens, and safeguarding interests abroad.124 “[P]rosecution and
long prison sentences have directly challenged the impression of impunity” surrounding the crime of piracy, and serve as a key deterrent to
current offenders and future recruits.125 However, as indicated in the
most recent series of prosecutions, existing piracy laws on the books in
the United States are at best poorly tailored to address acts of maritime
piracy in the twenty-first century, if not unconstitutional. For example,
although Congress has recognized varying degrees of offenders’ culpability in several municipal piracy statutes, there remains just one catchall
general piracy statute, encompassing an extremely broad scope of conduct yet imposing a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment regardless
of the act.126 Moreover, as that statute’s sentencing requirement was recently found to violate the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual
120
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 101, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S.
3, 346, available at https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201833/v1833.pdf (emphasis added).
121
United States v. Said (Said I), 757 F. Supp. 2d 554 (E.D. Va. 2010), vacated, 680 F.3d
374 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 599 (E.D. Va. 2010).
122
See Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 633–34.
123
Id. at 634.
124
See THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 17.
125
See id. annex A, at 3.
126
18 U.S.C.A. § 1651 (Westlaw 2015); see id. §§ 1652–1661.
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punishment,127 it remains uncertain whether the United States is even
capable of actively prosecuting suspected pirates in the absence of a clear
jurisdictional nexus if the circumstances do not warrant a life sentence.
A.

THE CRIME OF PIRACY AS DEFINED BY THE LAW OF NATIONS HAS
EXPANDED TO ENCOMPASS A WIDE VARIETY OF CONDUCT

18 U.S.C. § 1651 is a unique statute in that it proscribes the offense
known as general piracy by reference to the definition of piracy according to “the law of nations.” Rather than specifically enumerating any
particular kinds of conduct, the statute directs prosecutors to ascertain the
prohibited conduct by looking to codifications of customary international
law.128 Furthermore, although generally criminal statutes are to be interpreted according to their meaning when written, several courts recently
considering the application of § 1651 have concluded that the reference
to the “law of nations,” a changing body of law, demonstrates a clear
congressional intent to incorporate any subsequent developments in the
international definition of piracy within its proscription of the crime.129
Such an approach is ideal for purposes of exercising universal jurisdiction, as it eliminates the need for constant amendments to ensure the
statute mirrors the international consensus definition. However, as the
nature of piracy operations,130 as well as the international definition of
piracy, has evolved to encompass various forms of ancillary or facilitative conduct,131 § 1651 is now capable of reaching a significantly expanded scope of criminal activity compared to when it was originally
adopted. As a result of this expansion, a wide variety of offenders are
subject to the statute’s mandatory sentence of life in prison, many of
whom would receive a significantly lesser punishment had their conduct
occurred on land or where a jurisdictional nexus could be established.132
In the past, the crime of piracy was generally defined as an act of
robbery on the high seas.133 This was the definition incorporated in the
first U.S. piracy statutes and used by the Supreme Court in 1820 in
Smith.134 Relying on Smith, the robbery element was cited as recently as
2010 when used as a basis for granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss
127

Said II, 3 F. Supp. 3d 515 (E.D. Va. 2014).
18 U.S.C.A. § 1651 (Westlaw 2015).
129
See United States v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 599, 629–30 (E.D. Va. 2010).
130
See Somali Piracy: More Sophisticated Than You Thought, supra note 30.
131
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 101, supra note 120, at 436.
132
See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1657 (Westlaw 2015) (imposing a maximum sentence of three years).
133
See Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 621–23.
134
United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153, 160–62 (1820); see United States v. Said, 757 F.
Supp. 2d 554, 559–61 (E.D. Va. 2010), vacated, 680 F.3d 374 (4th Cir. 2012).
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a piracy charge based on a failed attack, in United States v. Said (Said
I).135 Because the crime included the element of robbery, the number of
individuals within the reach of § 1651 was necessarily limited, and individuals suspected of other maritime related crimes had to be prosecuted
under different statutes.
Modernly, as discussed above, the definition of piracy for purposes
of § 1651 is set forth in UNCLOS Article 101 and is substantially
broader.136 Although UNCLOS Article 101 retains acts of high seas robbery within the scope of the definition, a variety of other activities are
also included as constituting piracy.137 Most significantly, acts of intentional facilitation of the more traditional piratical conduct are included
within the UNCLOS definition under subdivision (c),138 thereby rendering facilitative conduct equal to principal acts under § 1651. Additionally, subdivision (b) defines as piracy any voluntary participation in the
operation of a pirate ship.139
The issue of facilitative conduct under § 1651 was addressed directly in two recent cases, United States v. Ali and United States v.
Shibin.140 In Ali, faced with the question whether a ransom negotiator,
whose conduct occurred almost entirely within Somalia’s territorial waters, could be charged with piracy under § 1651, a panel of the D.C.
Circuit answered in the affirmative, finding such conduct was the functional equivalent of aider-and-abettor liability.141 The Fourth Circuit, in
Shibin, subsequently relied on the DC Circuit’s decision in Ali, convicting a second ransom negotiator under § 1651 based on his involvement
in securing the release of the German merchant ship Marida Marguerite
in exchange for $5 million.142 These cases provide a perfect illustration
of the new expanded scope of § 1651, as neither defendant took part in
any physical attack on the vessels but rather came aboard once the
seizure had occurred.
Aside from the fact the defendants in Ali and Shibin were convicted
under § 1651 as negotiators rather than principal actors in the attacks,
these holdings are significant because of where the defendants’ conduct
occurred. Notably, in each case the defendant’s conduct took place al135

Said I, 757 F. Supp. 2d at 559–61.
See United States v. Dire, 680 F.3d 446, 469 (4th Cir. 2012); United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea art. 101, supra note 120, at 436.
137
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 101, supra note 120, at 436.
138
Id.
139
Id.
140
United States v. Ali, 718 F.3d 929 (D.C. Cir. 2013); United States v. Shibin, 722 F.3d 233
(4th Cir. 2013).
141
Ali, 718 F.3d at 936–41.
142
Shibin, 722 F.3d 233.
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most entirely within Somali territorial waters as opposed to the high
seas,143 which is required for conviction as a principal under UNCLOS
Article 101(a).144 In holding that § 1651 authorizes the U.S. prosecution
of piracy facilitators whose conduct occurs within a foreign territory, the
courts in Ali and Shibin emphasized the lack of explicit geographical
language in UNCLOS Article 101(c).145 The Ali court pointed to the absence of the language “on the high seas” and “outside the jurisdiction of
any state” that appears in Article 101(a), and concluded that facilitative
conduct prohibited by Article 101(c) is not subject to the same geographical restrictions, so long as the conduct facilitated does occur on the high
seas.146 Although such an interpretation appears in line with settled principles of statutory construction,147 the breadth of this holding becomes
more apparent when such a reading is applied to UNCLOS Article
101(b).
Much like UNCLOS Article 101(c), subdivision (b) of the same Article also lacks the explicit geographical language included in subdivision (a).148 Subdivision (b) provides that “any act of voluntary
participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge
of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft” constitutes piracy.149 Applying the same rules of construction, voluntary participation in the operation of a pirate ship, no matter where such participation occurs, is
sufficient to support a charge of piracy under § 1651. When read in tandem with the UNCLOS Article 103 definition of a pirate ship, it is only
necessary that one voluntarily participate in the operation of a ship “intended by the persons in dominant control to be used for the purpose of
committing one of the acts referred to in article 101” to be within the
statute’s reach and its mandatory sentence of life imprisonment.150
Although the courts provided no guidance on Article 101(b) and the
definition of “voluntary participation in the operation of” a pirate ship,
one can imagine how this vague language encompasses an extremely
broad scope of activities. In addition to sailing aboard a ship seeking to
carry out an attack, activities such as standing watch or preparing meals
143

See Ali, 718 F.3d at 934; Shibin, 722 F.3d at 236.
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 101(a), supra note 120, at 436.
145
Ali, 718 F.3d at 937–41; United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 101, supra
note 120, at 436.
146
Ali, 718 F.3d at 939–41.
147
Id. at 937 (“Where Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but
omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally
and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” (quoting Dean v. United States, 556 U.S. 568,
573 (2009)).
148
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 101(b), supra note 120, at 436.
149
Id.
150
Id. at 437 (emphasis added).
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while ransom negotiations are on going may also be included. As such
activities may occur anywhere, it is easy to see how the connection between those voluntary participants and actual pirate attacks may grow
increasingly attenuated. Yet because § 1651 draws no distinction between Article 101(a) and 101(b), offenders fitting either definition are
susceptible to the same charge and consequently the same punishment.
In sum, the use of UNCLOS and the interpretation provided by the
courts in Ali and Shibin results in a dramatic expansion of who may be
considered a pirate within the scope of 18 U.S.C. § 1651 and thus susceptible to the exercise of universal jurisdiction. Although negotiating
ransoms and other intentional acts facilitating piracy are far from innocent conduct, proscribing all such conduct under a single statute and imposing a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without regard to
culpability is the precise reason the constitutionality of § 1651 was called
into question. Even if it is the position of both the United States and the
international community that ancillary acts contributing to pirate activities are acts of piracy in and of themselves, relying on a single statute
without allowing courts sentencing discretion to punish such acts runs
the risk of unconstitutionality under the Eighth Amendment, and as discussed further below, seemingly conflicts with the original intent of
Congress.
B.

CONGRESS HAS ALREADY RECOGNIZED SEVERAL ACTS THAT
AMOUNT TO PIRACY, SOME OF WHICH CARRY LESSER
PENALTIES THAN LIFE IMPRISONMENT

Apart from the need to account for the recently expanded scope of
conduct now falling within the international definition of piracy and
therefore § 1651, a second reason for amending the current statutory system is to more accurately reflect Congress’s intent regarding the punishment of ancillary acts of piracy. More specifically, Congress’s decision
to adopt several other municipal piracy statutes, which expressly enumerate certain ancillary acts of piracy such as those covered by UNCLOS
Article 101(b) and (c) discussed above, suggests a view that not all “pirates” are deserving of the same punishment.151 As stated by the district
court in United States v. Said (Said II), “Congress has . . . expressed its
intent to punish lesser conduct of piracy by enacting other pirate statutes,” all of which include corresponding punishments that generally are
less than mandatory life imprisonment.152 However, because these other
piracy statutes are municipal, rather than general, they cannot be applied
151
152

See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1652–1661 (Westlaw 2015).
Said II, 3 F. Supp. 3d 515, 521 (E.D. Va. 2014).
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in cases requiring the exercise of universal jurisdiction. Thus, under the
current system, whether a suspected offender will face § 1651’s
mandatory sentence of life imprisonment, or a lesser punishment imposed by a municipal statute, may depend not on the conduct, but simply
whether the vessel attacked was registered in the United States or had
U.S. citizens on board.
Said provides an example of the overlap between § 1651 and an onpoint municipal statute incapable of use in a universal-jurisdiction
case.153 In Said, the defendant took part in an unsuccessful attempt to
attack a U.S. Navy frigate; the issue in the case was whether attempted
attacks amounted to piracy under § 1651.154 The court in Said I looked
to other sections of Title 18 during its analysis and concluded that, because 18 U.S.C. § 1659 criminalizes the exact conduct—attempted attacks—the government sought to include under § 1651, the latter should
be read more narrowly so as not to overlap.155 The court deemed it illogical, “in light of the ten year imprisonment penalty Congress promulgated for a violation of § 1659,” that a defendant who committed such a
minor act was meant to be exposed “to the penalty of life in prison for
piracy under § 1651.”156 Although this decision was later vacated on appeal,157 the glaring inconsistency in punishment later arose in Said II, as
the defendant challenged the constitutionality of imposing life imprisonment for the incident in which no harm occurred.158
Similarly, facilitative conduct, now within the scope of § 1651, has a
municipal counterpart in 18 U.S.C. § 1657, which provides as follows:
Whoever attempts to corrupt any commander, master, officer, or mariner to yield up or to run away with any vessel, or any goods, wares, or
merchandise, or to turn pirate or to go over to or confederate with
pirates, or in any wise to trade with any pirate, knowing him to be
such; or
Whoever furnishes such pirate with any ammunition, stores, or provisions of any kind; or
Whoever fits out any vessel knowingly and, with a design to trade
with, supply, or correspond with any pirate or robber upon the seas; or
Whoever consults, combines, confederates, or corresponds with any
pirate or robber upon the seas, knowing him to be guilty of any piracy
or robbery; or
Whoever, being a seaman, confines the master of any vessel—
153

Said I, 757 F. Supp. 2d 554 (E.D. Va. 2010), vacated, 680 F.3d 374 (4th Cir. 2012).
Id.
155
See id. at 563, 567.
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See id. at 563.
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See United States v. Said, 680 F.3d 374, 375 (4th Cir. 2012).
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Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years,
or both.159

Confederating, “furnish[ing]. . .with. . .provisions of any kind” and “correspond[ing] with any pirate or robber upon the seas,” are all the functional equivalent of the sort of facilitative conduct—negotiating
ransoms—at issue in Ali and Shibin. However, because § 1657 is but a
municipal statute, and is therefore restricted in application to those acts
sharing a jurisdictional nexus with the United States, it cannot be used
for cases requiring the exercise of universal jurisdiction. This creates a
situation in which prosecutors must instead rely on the broader § 1651,
rather than the more appropriate § 1657, which imposes a significantly
lesser punishment of “not more than three years.”
Congress’s decision to enact numerous statutes proscribing various
forms of piracy and ancillary acts is evidence of its intent that these
crimes are distinct and deserve different punishments. Although in the
past such ancillary acts may have not fit within the definition of piracy
under customary international law, UNCLOS makes clear that view has
changed.160 Thus, because the international community now recognizes
these other forms of piracy, they may provide a basis for the exercise of
universal jurisdiction, so long as the domestic statutes are worded in a
manner that reflects customary international law. Rather than creating a
scenario such as Said II, in which § 1651 could be ruled unconstitutional
as applied because of the grossly disproportionate sentence of life in
prison for a crime Congress has stated deserves three years, Congress
should adopt statutes to reflect the language of UNCLOS Article 101(b)
and (c), allowing for commensurate punishment, so that universal jurisdiction may be exercised to the full extent permitted under international
law.
C.

THE CURRENT PRACTICE OF IMPOSING MANDATORY SENTENCES OF
LIFE IMPRISONMENT IS INCONSISTENT WITH CONTEMPORARY
STANDARDS AND RUNS AFOUL OF THE EIGHTH
AMENDMENT

The final reason to amend the statutory scheme in place in the
United States for addressing acts of piracy in universal-jurisdiction cases
is to comply with the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits punishment

159
160
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beyond what is proportional to the crime.161 As discussed above, when a
suspected pirate is charged under § 1651, he or she is subject to the statute’s mandatory sentence of life imprisonment regardless of the specific
circumstances of the conduct. Previously such harsh sentencing was in
line with the rest of the international community, in part because of the
more narrow definition of piracy, but sentencing practices have since
changed as the crime has evolved.162 Moreover, as seen in the case of
Said II, a statute that prevents courts from considering the actual harm
caused yet imposes a sentence life imprisonment may run afoul of the
Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment.163
Although there is no international standard for the punishment of
piracy, comparing U.S. practices to those of other nations is particularly
useful for establishing the current disparity in sentencing. According to a
recent empirical study comparing piracy prosecutions around the globe
during the 2006–2010 period, the average sentence among pirate-prosecuting nations was sixteen years.164 At the low end of the spectrum are
Kenya, Holland, and Yemen, with minimum jail terms of 4.5 or 5
years.165 At the far opposite is the United States, imposing life sentences
as both the minimum and maximum. Although other nations imposed a
variety of sentence lengths in between the two extremes, the study
pointed out that excluding the U.S. cases from the data set drops the
mean to 12.6 years.166
Aside from the great disparity in sentence length between the United
States and other prosecuting nations, however, the most significant flaw
with the current approach of applying § 1651 is the failure to take into
account the specifics of the crime at issue. There are undoubtedly situations in which offenders are deserving of life in prison for their actions,
and all acts of piracy contribute to what is a serious threat to the free
flow of global commerce. Moreover, “the U.S. has a reputation for relatively strict criminal punishment” compared to more lenient European
nations, and a disparity alone is not a reason to change sentence
lengths.167 However, a significant reason for this disparity stems from
the fact the United States does not take into account mitigating factors, or
a particular pirate’s culpability, and instead uses a life sentence for every
161
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offender charged under § 1651.168 Thus nonviolent negotiators who satisfy the definition of a pirate under international law face the same punishment as those who attack, endanger, and harm or kill mariners.
Although nations are free to impose whatever punishments they see
fit,169 and such a practice certainly achieves the U.S. objective of deterrence, such a policy is incompatible with the Eighth Amendment.
When analyzing whether a sentence is “grossly disproportionate for
a particular defendant’s crime” as prohibited by the Eighth Amendment,
a court must compare the gravity of the offense and the severity of the
sentence.170 Significantly, as pointed out by the court in Said II, “what is
critical [in the analysis] is the gravity of the conduct of the individual
defendant.”171 The Supreme Court has listed several factors to be considered when assessing the gravity of a defendant’s conduct, including harm
caused, culpability, and the magnitude of the crime.172 Considering that a
mandatory sentence of life imprisonment is the second most severe sentence possible in our criminal justice system, it follows that a defendant’s
actions deserving of such punishment must be of a serious nature and
cause grave harm. Again, although there are undoubtedly acts of piracy
falling within this category, the broad scope of piracy in the modern era
includes a variety of deeds, some of which cause more harm than others.
For example, negotiators and other facilitators, while contributing to the
larger attack, are less culpable on an individual basis than those actually
attacking ships, particularly if no victim experiences physical harm.
The international community views piracy as a grave crime, with the
potential to seriously threaten the lives of mariners while disrupting the
freedom of the seas, and rightfully so. Moreover, as piracy in the modern
era depends on a variety of actors, both at sea and on shore, one cannot
ignore the fact that without facilitators the actual attacks cannot happen.
In fact, it is for this reason much of antipiracy strategies focus on taking
out the support systems that allow the attacks to happen.173 With that
said, the crime is also committed by several individuals, each of whom
plays a separate role in any given attack. The current system in place in
the United States for universal-jurisdiction cases instead relies on an umbrella statute, grouping all pirates together and imposing mandatory
sentences of life imprisonment on all of them. With the term “piracy”
168
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now encompassing such a broad scope of activities, the one-punishmentfits-all approach is no longer appropriate, given the restrictions placed by
the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment. Instead,
establishing a series of statutes imposing commensurate punishments, or
at least allowing judicial discretion by removing § 1651’s life imprisonment mandate, will improve prosecutorial efficiency while incorporating
the evolving standards of punishment, as Eighth Amendment jurisprudence commands.
V.

RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

As explained above, the legal framework in place in the United
States to address acts of piracy, particularly in cases requiring the exercise of universal jurisdiction, has failed to keep up with the evolution of
the crime in the modern era. “Pirates,” as defined by UNCLOS, now
include a wide variety of actors, ranging from the traditional principals
who attack and plunder, to translators, negotiators, and other
facilitators.174 As a result of this expansion, the crime of piracy can no
longer be adequately addressed using just one statute mandating life in
prison, as is the current approach to all universal-jurisdiction cases. Not
only does such a practice raise concerns of unconstitutionality under the
Eighth Amendment, it is also inconsistent with contemporary international standards of punishment.175 Moreover, because life sentences are
extremely costly, as is the litigation process in cases of such magnitude,
amending this system can lessen this burden while also improving efficiency.176 Making the prosecutorial process more straightforward, with
clear statutes imposing appropriate punishments, can lessen the likelihood of lengthy appeals, including those based on the sort of constitutional challenge raised in the case of Said II.177
Fortunately, the necessary changes can be made rather simply. First,
Congress could continue to use the language of § 1651—“piracy as defined by the law of nations”—but replace the mandatory minimum sentence of life imprison with a range of, for example, ten years to life.
Doing so would ensure that the law would continue to incorporate developments in customary international law with respect to the crime of
piracy and permit the exercise of universal jurisdiction, but provide prosecutors and judges with discretion in asking for and imposing punish174
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ment. This would allow for the consideration of mitigating or
aggravating factors in each individual case, including actual harm caused
by the defendant’s conduct. Of course, prosecutors could still seek the
maximum punishment of life in prison when they see fit, but in cases
involving less severe acts of piracy, seeking a lesser sentence would
lessen the likelihood of facing an appeal, or even increase the possibility
of securing a plea. While the United States may continue to pursue a
policy of imposing relatively strict punishments for all forms of piracy as
a means of deterrence, those goals may still be achieved without imposing a life sentence in every instance.
The second option is to adopt additional statutes proscribing acts of
piracy as defined in UNCLOS Article 101(b) and (c), or piracy facilitation. As it is now established, UNCLOS serves as a codification of customary international law on piracy,178 and universal jurisdiction may be
asserted in all cases involving conduct that UNCLOS defines as piracy.
Adopting statutes that mirror the language of UNCLOS Article 101(b)
and (c) will permit the United States to exercise universal jurisdiction
over such conduct, but also to impose punishment in accordance with the
original intent of Congress, as expressed in the several existing municipal piracy statutes. Doing so would similarly make sentencing more proportional to the specific crime as is required by the Eighth Amendment,
while lessening the burden that comes with lengthy trials, appeals, and
incarcerations.
As the United States has now established its intention to take a leadership role in the international fight against piracy,179 adopting a statutory system that ensures efficient and just prosecution of pirates to the
full extent permitted by international law is a necessary component of
achieving strategic goals. Prosecution is an effective tool for deterring
those considering future piracy operations, as well as punishing those
who harm U.S. citizens and interests, both directly and indirectly. However, the current one-statute-fits-all approach is ill suited for addressing
the complex nature of piracy in the modern era, and is incompatible with
the commands of the Constitution. Congress should amend this system to
account for the evolution of piracy in the modern era, as well as contemporary standards of criminal punishment.
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